NFPA
13 in High-Rise Buildings
Designing and
installing fire standpipes and sprinkler systems in modern high-rise buildings
properly requires in-depth analysis to ensure occupant safety.
High-rise buildings present
several unique challenges not found in traditional low-rise buildings; longer
egress times and distance, evacuation strategies, fire department
accessibility, smoke movement and fire control.
Nearly 3,700 years ago, the
responsibility of the stability of a structure was first bestowed upon building
inspectors. The inspectors made sure that building materials were properly cut
and made from unflawed components. When the inspectors deemed a stone to be of
sufficient quality, they were authorized to affix the king’s seal to the stone.
If subsequently a building collapsed and a sealed stone was found to be at
fault, the inspector was at fault. This king was, of course, Hammurabi, the
inspectors were the progenitors of today’s testing laboratories, and the
rationales they used to determine the stone’s quality were the original
standards.
High-rise buildings have
garnered significant attention in the fire safety world over the years. The
multiple floors of a high-rise building create the cumulative effect of
requiring great numbers of persons to travel great vertical distances on stairs
in order to evacuate the building. The public, code bodies, local, regional and
federal governments, as well as the design, build, and ownership communities
are all affected by high-rise building safety.
The 42 is a residential skyscraper in Kolkata in
the state of West Bengal, India. It is currently the tallest
building in India. It is located in Chowringhee, the central
business district of the city.
The primary design and
installation standard used in most of the U.S. for commercial fire sprinkler
systems is NFPA 13 2019: Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems. To
properly use this standard to design or install a system, one must be familiar
with the standards upon which it is based and those which it references. It is
within these auxiliary standards that lurk the minefields that can explode with
devastating effect. For example, one of the commonly misunderstood provisions
of NFPA 13 is Section 6.1.1., which many believe requires that all materials
and devices be listed. It does not.
NFPA 13 recognizes there are
eminently acceptable materials, such as pipe, fittings, and valves,
manufactured to other long-respected standards promulgated by the American
Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME), and the Manufacturer’s Standardization Society
(MSS) of the Valve and Fittings Industry that, when properly selected and
applied, will result in perfectly satisfactory strength, durability, and
performance. In fact, the materials manufactured to these standards typically
have ranges much more appropriate to today’s taller structures than do those
listed to the arbitrary and archaic limit of 175 psi found in NFPA 13.
It is therefore important that
the engineer designing the fire standpipes and sprinkler systems in modern
high-rise buildings properly analyze the needs of the systems, determine the
pressures to which the systems will be subject, and, through judicious
application of the principles of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
provisions found in ASME B31.1 and B31.9, select the pipe, fittings, and valves
most suitable for the installation.
An equally important factor in
materials selection is the system’s life expectancy. It must be determined,
through conversations with the owner, user, and regulatory agencies, what the
expectations are for the service life of the systems and their components as
well as the building life they are protecting. This, coupled with the
engineer’s knowledge of the environment into which they will be placed, allows
for selection of materials and corrosion mitigation strategies that will assure
an adequate service life, as not all materials are created equal and not all
materials used in proximity to each other are compatible.
Blind reliance on listed
materials bearing a mark from Underwriters Laboratories (UL) or Factory
Mutual Global (FM Global) does not come close to satisfying the standard
of care to which an engineer is held, nor does it assure there will not be
legal arguments at some future date as to the adequacy of the materials selected.
A simple example is the standard commercial riser manifold produced by most of
the manufacturers that bears both the FM Global and UL marks and a molded or
engraved pressure limit identifier of 175 psi. Upon detailed examination, it
can be determined that many of these devices are clearly acceptable for
pressures well in excess of 175 psi. However, they are only listed to 175 psi
because the UL and FM Global standards under which they are listed arbitrarily
chose this number from an oft-repeated pressure in NFPA 13. And, in fact, it is
not possible in modern high-rise buildings to limit the pressure of the
principal piping systems to 175 psi. Even though recent times have seen the
inclusion of products listed at pressures up to 300 psi, such listings do not
cover the full catalogue of needs, nor is 300 psi a magic bullet number any
more than is 175 psi.
There is simply no substitute
for doing an appropriate engineering analysis of system needs and specifying
materials and devices that will meet the demands of that analysis. Mere
reliance on the obvious provisions within NPFA 13, the listing directories of
UL and FM Global and manufacturer’s catalogues written to satisfy the
requirements of those documents is not adequate.
In preparing specifications,
the engineer must be careful to specify only that which he needs and intends to
enforce. Clauses such as “Comply with all applicable federal, state, and local
codes and standards” don’t cut it. First, few engineers know what constitutes
“all” of those applicable federal, state, and local codes and standards as they
each have internal references to and adoptions of yet more codes and standards.
Second, even fewer engineers have “all” of those codes and standards on their
shelves; most of those who do have them are not aware of what is in them. And
what is in Code A is not always compatible with the requirement of Standard B,
though both are applicable and the more stringent will apply.
For example, NPFA 13 requires that to fully equip a building, sprinklers
must be installed in all places that a fire could occur. An elevator machine
room is such a space. However, ASME A17.1 Rule 102.2: Safety Code for Elevators
and Escalators requires that electrical power to the equipment be shut off
prior to the application of water. There is no direct connection between the
response time and temperature rating of a heat detector and that of a
sprinkler. The response time index (RTI) of a sprinkler is determined by what
is known as the plunge test; there is no similar or equivalent test for a heat
detector. Therefore, there is no way to reasonably comply with Section 21.4.1
of NPFA 72: National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, which requires a heat
detector be provided to respond appropriately prior to sprinkler activation. Feasibility
requires a much more complex solution, especially when the intent of the code
is taken into consideration.
One method of accomplishing
the intent of these seemingly incompatible codes and standards would be to
install a double interlock pre-action system within the elevator machine room
and to require that one of the events necessary for the double interlock to
release be the completion of the timing sequence for elevator recall. As
elevator manufacturers will not permit direct monitoring of elevator circuitry
to determine the initiation and status of recall, one must rely on a
predetermined time and initiate that timer based on either smoke or heat
detection within the elevator machine room. In the event of an actual fire, the
other portion of the double interlock, the fusing of the sprinkler and
consequent reduction in air pressure within the air-supervised pre-action
system, will assure the presence of water in a timely manner when the
electrically held valve is opened by the timing sequence.
Consulting or specifying engineer has a statutory first duty to
preserve the public safety and a fiduciary duty to his client, normally the
owner, it is an abrogation of those duties for the engineer to delegate
responsibility to the design/build contractor, who is only required to comply
with the lawful mandate of the local inspection authorities and has a fiduciary
duty only to its ownership, by means of that all-too-commonly used bailout,
“Contractor to provide and install a system complying with all applicable codes
and standards.”
Ref: NFPA.orgOur Follower firesafetypunjab ask below question.
As discussed, NFPA 13 is an installation standard and does not specify which buildings or structures require a sprinkler system. NFPA 13 specifies how to properly design and install a sprinkler system using the proper components and materials after it has been determined that a sprinkler system is required. The administrative authority for requiring sprinklers within buildings rests with any of the following: the local building code; NFPA 5000, Building Construction and Safety Code; NFPA 101, Life Safety Code; International Building Code; or insurance regulations that typically specify which buildings and structures require sprinkler systems.
If you are using the strategies of the NFPA 101, Life Safety Code for an existing building, section 31.3.5.12 has an application for high-rise buildings.
Excerpt from 2015 NFPA 101 Existing Apartment Occupancies
Here are the references for the standards for installation:
Its most interesting that the building code deals with new construction not existing occupancies. Therefore the AHJ that is dealing only with the building code will naturally require new construction for renovations.
I can not speculate what the local building codes and regulations are for automatic sprinkler system.
Thanks to Milt Werner for correction.